Different models of thinking reflect the tension that exists between the rational and objective scientific world view, and the basic concepts that assume the existence of ambiguity, uncertainty and double meaning inherent in nature. Social scientists, positivists, who adopted the rational scientific world view, tried to apply natural science to monitoring and controlling reality. Thus, they became committed to the approaches of the natural sciences that include the separation of theory from observed facts, and learning of reality by experiencing the senses (empiricism) (Peile, 1988). This commitment examines of the validity of theories in the world of facts that exists independently. Positivism does so by neutral quantification and statistical regularity of observed events. The positivist direction of the relations is from the outside world to a person’s inner world.

In terms of therapeutic practice, classifying models of thinking, as presented, suggests that different models of thinking affect methods of problems solving. Also, selecting a particular intervention model points to the therapists knowledge domain and perhaps to the type of results.

If we believe that the truth is in the model, and we have the right model (theory), then the causal reasoning model, often used in natural sciences, is the most appropriate model. However, if we believe that truth is partially in the model, and partially in data, then the search would be for a model that is found mainly in social sciences  (Bhatnagar&Kanal, 1992).

It is important to mention that models of thinking, as sets of basic beliefs, are not open to proof in any conventional sense; and there is no way to prefer one model over another as if it was the absolute, the fundamental.

A given thinking model represents simply the familiar and the most sophisticated concept that proponents of the model could present. Therefore, there is no an absolutely right model. The proponents of a particular model should count, claiming about the stance, on the conviction and utility more than on the proof (Guba & Lincoln,1994).